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SOCIAL OPTIMA IN LEADER-FOLLOWER MEAN FIELD LINEAR
QUADRATIC CONTROL ∗
Jianhui Huang1, Bing-Chang Wang2 and Tinghan Xie †, 1
Abstract. This paper investigates a linear quadratic mean field leader-follower team problem, where
the model involves one leader and a large number of weakly-coupled interactive followers. The leader
and the followers cooperate to optimize the social cost. Specifically, for any strategy provided first by the
leader, the followers would like to choose a strategy to minimize social cost functional. Using variational
analysis and person-by-person optimality, we construct two auxiliary control problems. By solving
sequentially the auxiliary control problems with consistent mean field approximations, we can obtain
a set of decentralized social optimality strategy with help of a class of forward-backward consistency
systems. The relevant Stackelberg equilibrium is further proved under some proper conditions.
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Introduction
Mean field games have been studied by researchers from various aspects [7, 8, 10, 25]. They involve a large
number of population and the interaction between each individual is negligible. The mean field game approach
has been applied in many fields such as finance [14], economics [41], information technology [21], engineering
[13, 24] and medicine [4]. The mean field linear quadratic (LQ) control problem is a special class of control
problems, which can model many problems in applications and its solution exhibits elegant properties. For
more work about the problem, readers can refer to [3, 9, 18,19,22,26,36,37,39,44].
For the model with one major player and N minor players, the state of the major player has a significant
influence on state equations and cost functionals of other minor individuals, which can be considered as a
strong effect of the major player on minor ones. Mean field games (control) with major and minor players have
been discussed in some literature, such as [23, 32] for LQ problems, [6, 33] for nonlinear problems, [12, 20] for
probabilistic approaches and [11] for finite-state problems. In such types of problem, there is no hierarchical
structure of decision making between the major player and the minor players.
In contrast to the model discussed above, leader-follower (Stackelberg) problems contain at least two hier-
archies of players. One hierarchy of the players is defined as the leaders with a major position and another
hierarchy of the players is defined as the followers with a minor position. The leader has priority to announce a
strategy first and then the followers seek their strategies to minimize their cost functionals with response to the
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given strategy of leader. According to the followers’ optimal points, the leader will choose his optimal strategy
to minimize its cost functional. Leader-follower problem also has been widely investigated. For example, the
two-person leader-follower problem combines with stochastic LQ differential game had been studied by Yong
in [43] and the problem of one leader and N followers who play a noncooperative game under LQ stochastic
differential game had been studied by Moon and Basar in [31]. For further literature related to Stackelberg
games, readers can refer to [1, 2, 27,29,34,35,38] .
Different from noncooperative games, the social optimization (team optimization) problem is a joint decision
problem which all the players have the same goal and work cooperatively. The aim of each player is to select
an optimal strategy and maximize the total payoff. Team optimization problem has been studied for many
years. Marschak [30] first considered team optimization based on game theory. Ho and Chu studied team
decision theory in optimal control problems [17]. Groves did the research of viewing the incentive problem as
a team problem which the information for decisions is incomplete [16]. The team theory and person-by-person
optimization with binary decision was investigated by Bauso and Pesenti [5] and the team problems under
stochastic information structure with suboptimal solutions was studied in [15].
In this paper, we investigate social optimality of the leader-follower mean field LQ control problem. Our
model contains one leader and N followers. The leader’s state appears in both state equation and cost functional
of each follower. It shows that the dynamics and cost functionals of the N followers are directly influenced by
the behavior of the leader. Unlike the model in [23, 31], our model has a population state average term in all
state equations and cost functionals. This implies that such state dynamics and cost functionals are highly
interactive and coupled. In reality, it is almost impossible for one player to obtain all the information of other
players. Therefore, decentralized control which is based on the individual information set will be used instead of
centralized control which is based on full information set and the information structure of each agent is different.
Compared with previous works, this paper mainly makes the following contributions:
• A social optimum problem is studied for mean field models with hierarchical structure. Unlike the
problem in [31] where the leader and followers play a noncooperative game and try to minimize their own
individual cost functional, all individuals in our models aim to minimize the social cost functional which
equals the summation of cost functionals of all players. The N followers are coupled by the population
state average term. Since the cost functional presents individual performance in the game problems,
the order of magnitude of the perturbation is 1N which can be ignored. The population state average
term may be approximated by a stochastic process directly (see [18]). However, in the team problems,
the order of magnitude of the perturbation cannot be ignored after summing up all the cost functionals,
which makes the problem very complicated. To overcome such difficulties, we approximate some terms
as N goes to infinity and use a duality procedure combined with auxiliary equations to transform the
variation of the social cost functional into a standard LQ control form. Then, we construct an auxiliary
control problem and a forward-backward consistency system which contains four equations to help us
obtain the decentralized form of the optimal controls for the N followers.
• The decentralized controls of the leader-follower problem are obtained and the solvability of a high-
dimensional consistency condition system (CC system) is discussed. Since the leader’s state equation
and cost functional are fully coupled with the followers’ state equations and cost functionals, it is
more difficult to solve the leader’s problem. Except constructing auxiliary problem by mean field
approximation as in the former part, we need to construct six auxiliary equations and use duality
relations to obtain the decentralized form of the optimal control for the leader. Unlike the problem
for N followers, the final CC system of the leader’s problem contains ten equations which becomes a
high-dimensional problem. To solve such equations directly is very difficult since they are fully coupled
and have high-dimensional characteristics. We transform the high-dimensional CC system to a simple
form of linear forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE; see [28, 42]) and discuss the
solvability of the FBSDE through Ricatti equation method.
• The decentralized strategies of leader-follower problem are proved to be Stackelberg equilibrium by
perturbation analysis. Different from [22,23,31,40], we discuss the Stackelberg equilibrium for the team
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optimization problem. First, we need to prove the decentralized strategies for the followers have asymp-
totic social optimality. Because of the Stackelberg problem contains two hierarchies, we consider two
coupled cost functionals (the leader and the followers) when using the standard method (see [22]). We
prove the asymptotic optimality by decoupling them with two duality procedures and some arguments
in error estimates. Second, we need to prove the decentralized strategies for the leader-follower problem
is Stackelberg equilibrium. Also, some error estimates are very hard to be given directly since they are
fully coupling. We decompose them by applying Ricatti equation method and then estimate them in
proper order.
In the real world, our model can be used to describe some examples. For an automatic machine, the major
part first gives an information to the system and the minor parts will adjust their parameters automatically
such that the whole system keeps in the best state. For the economic environment, the small companies may
hesitate to make decisions and often follow a monopoly company when facing to the volatility of the market.
A monopoly company announces a decision first. Once the small companies try to make decisions according to
their own situations, the monopoly company adjusts its decision such that the sum of the social wealth can be
maximized. Moreover, the relationship between the employer and the employees or the federal government and
the government in each state also can be described by our model.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem is formulated in Section 2. In Section 3, we solve the
optimal controls for followers based on person-by-person optimality and obtain the CC system of the follower’s
problem. In Section 4, we seek the social optimal solution of the leader’s problem and give the CC system of
the leader’s problem. Then the CC system is transformed to a simple form of linear FBSDE in Section 5 and
its wellposeness is discussed. In Section 6, we give the details of proving the Stackelberg equilibrium. Also,
some prior lemmas will be introduced and proved. In Section 7, a numerical example is provided to simulate
the efficiency of decentralized control. Section 8 is the conclusion of the paper.
Notation: Throughout this paper, Rn×m and Sn denote the set of all (n ×m) real matrices and the set of
all (n × n) symmetric matrices, respectively. ‖ · ‖ is the standard Euclidean norm and 〈·, ·〉 is the standard
Euclidean inner product. For given symmetric matrix S ≥ 0, the quadratic form xTSx may be defined as ‖x‖2S ,
where xT is the transpose of x. C1([0, T ];Rn×m) be the space of all Rn×m-valued continuously differentiable
functions on [0, T ]. For notation o(1), limn→∞ o(1) = 0. By [42], for sake of notation simplicity, we will use K
to denote a generic constant in following discussion. The value of K may be different at different places and it
only depends on the coefficients and initial values.
1. Problem formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space which contains all P-null sets in F . ξi ∈ Rn are the values of
the initial states and Wi(·) are d-dimensional standard Brownian motions, where i = 0, 1, · · · , N . ξi and Wi(·)
are defined on (Ω,F ,P). Consider a large-population system which contains one leader and N followers. The
state processes of the leader and the ith follower, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, are modeled by the following linear stochastic
differential equations (SDE) on a finite time horizon [0, T ]:
{
dx0(t) = [A0(t)x0(t) +B0(t)u0(t) + C0(t)x
(N)(t)]dt+D0(t)dW0(t), x0(0) = ξ0,
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + C(t)x
(N)(t) + F (t)x0(t)]dt+D(t)dWi(t), xi(0) = ξi,
(1)
where x(N)(t) := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) is the state average of the followers. Let σ-algebra F it = σ(Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
and Git = F it
∨
σ{ξi, ξ0,W0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, where 0 ≤ i ≤ N . Ft = σ(Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 0 ≤ i ≤ N) and
Gt = Ft
∨
σ{ξi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N}. Fi = {F it}0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by Wi(·) and Gi = {Git}0≤t≤T ,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ N . Correspondingly, we denote F = {Ft}0≤t≤T , G = {Gt}0≤t≤T . Next we introduce the following
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spaces:
L∞(0, T ;Rn×m) =
{
ϕ : [0, T ]→ Rn×m∣∣ ϕ(·) is bounded and measurable},
L2F(Ω;Rm) =
{
ξ : Ω→ Rm∣∣ ξ is F-measurable, E‖ξ‖2 <∞},
L2F(0, T ;Rm) =
{
x : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rm∣∣ x(·) is F-progressively
measurable, ‖x(t)‖2L2 := E
∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt <∞},
L2F(Ω;C([0, T ];Rm)) =
{
x : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rm∣∣ x(·) is F-progressively
measurable, continuous, E sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖x(t)‖2 <∞},
M[0, T ] := L2F(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))× L2F(Ω;C([0, T ];Rm))× L2F(0, T ;Rm×d).
The set of admissible controls for the leader is defined as follows:
U0 =
{
u0|u0(t) ∈ L2G0(0, T ;Rm)
}
,
and the set of admissible controls for the ith follower is defined as follows:
Ui =
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ L2Gi(0, T ;Rm)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
These are the decentralized control sets and we let U = U1 × U2 × · · · × UN . For comparison, the centralized
control set is given by
Uc =
{
(u0, u1, · · · , uN )|ui(t) ∈ L2G(0, T ;Rm), 0 ≤ i ≤ N
}
.
Now we introduce the cost functionals of the leader and the ith follower, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . For the leader, the cost
functional is defined as follows:
J0(u0(·);u(·)) =E
{∫ T
0
[‖x0(t)−Θ0(t)x(N)(t)− η0(t)‖2Q0(t) + ‖u0(t)‖2R0(t)]dt
+ ‖x0(T )− Θˆ0x(N)(T )− ηˆ0‖2G0
}
,
(2)
where u(·) = (u1(t), · · · , uN (t)) ∈ Uc. Q0(·), R0(·) and G0(·) are weight matrices. Q0(·) and Θ0(·) represent
the coupling between the leader and the population state average. This implies that the states of the followers
can influence the cost functional of the leader. For the ith follower, the individual cost functional is defined as
follows:
Ji(u0(·);u(·)) =E
{∫ T
0
[‖xi(t)−Θ(t)x(N)(t)−Θ1(t)x0(t)− η(t)‖2Q(t) + ‖ui(t)‖2R(t)]dt
+ ‖xi(T )− Θˆx(N)(T )− Θˆ1x0(T )− ηˆ‖2G
}
,
(3)
where Q(·), R(·) and G(·) are weight matrices. Q(·), Θ(·) and Θ1(·) represent the coupling between the ith
follower, the population state average and the leader. This implies that the cost functional of the ith follower
will be affected by the behavior of both the leader and the other followers. All the individuals in the system,
including the leader and followers, aim to minimize the social cost functional, which is denoted by
J (N)soc (u0(·);u(·)) = αNJ0(u0(·);u(·)) +
N∑
i=1
Ji(u0(·);u(·)), α > 0.
Similar to [23] and [32], we have a scaling factor αN before J0(u0(·);u(·)) such that J0(u0(·);u(·)) and
Ji(u0(·);u(·)) have the same order of magnitude. Otherwise, if αN = 1, then the performance of the leader will
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be insensitive when N becomes larger. Now we introduce our assumptions.
(A1) The coefficients of (1), (2) and (3) satisfy{
A0(·), C0(·), A(·), C(·), F (·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n),
B0(·), B(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), D0(·), D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×d).

Q0(·), Q(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sn), R0(·), R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm),
Θ0(·),Θ1(·),Θ(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n), η0(·), η(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn),
Θˆ0, Θˆ1, Θˆ ∈ Rn×n, G0, G ∈ Sn, ηˆ0, ηˆ ∈ Rn.
(A2) x0(0) and W0(·) are mutually independent. {xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and {Wi(·), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are indepen-
dent of each other. Exi(0) = ξˆ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . For some constant K, which is independent of N , such that
sup1≤i≤N E‖xi(0)‖2 ≤ K. Furthermore, x0(0), W0(·) and {xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are indepen-
dent of each other.
(A3) Q0(·) ≥ 0, R0(·) > δI, G0 ≥ 0 and Q(·) ≥ 0, R(·) > δI, G ≥ 0, for some δ > 0.
From now on, we may suppress the notation of time t if necessary. We introduce our leader-follower problem:
Problem 1.1. Under (A1)-(A3), for any u0 ∈ U0, to find a mapping M: U0 → U , and a control u¯0 ∈ U0 such
that 
J (N)soc (u0;M(u0)) = inf
u∈Uc
J (N)soc (u0;u),
J (N)soc (u¯0;M(u¯0)) = inf
u0∈U0
J (N)soc (u0;M(u0)).
Note that the M here is a mapping, which is different from the notation M[0, T ] we just introduced.
2. The mean field LQ control problem for the N followers
2.1. Person-by-person optimality
Fix u0 ∈ U0. The leader firstly announces his own open-loop strategy. Let u¯ = {u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N} be the
centralized optimal control of the followers and x¯ = {x¯1, x¯2, · · · , x¯N} be the corresponding states. Now we
perturb u¯i and fix other u¯j , where j 6= i. Then we denote δui = ui−u¯i, δxi = xi−x¯i, where ui is the control after
perturbing and xi is its corresponding state. The Fre´chet differential δJ0(δui) = J0(u0;u)−J0(u0; u¯)+o(‖δui‖)
and δJi(δui) = Ji(u0;u) − Ji(u0; u¯) + o(‖δui‖), where i = 1, · · · , N . Therefore, the variations of the state
equations for the leader, the ith follower and the jth follower, where j 6= i, are
dδx0 = (A0δx0 + C0δx
(N))dt, δx0(0) = 0,
dδxi = (Aδxi +Bδui + Cδx
(N) + Fδx0)dt, δxi(0) = 0,
dδxj = (Aδxj + Cδx
(N) + Fδx0)dt, δxj(0) = 0, j 6= i,
and the variations of their corresponding cost functionals are
1
2
δJ0(δui) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Q0(x¯0 −Θ0x¯(N) − η0), δx0 −Θ0δx(N)〉dt
+ 〈G0(x¯0(T )− Θˆ0x¯(N)(T )− ηˆ0), δx0(T )− Θˆ0δx(N)(T )〉
}
,
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1
2
δJi(δui) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δxi −Θδx(N) −Θ1δx0〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉dt
+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δxi(T )− Θˆδx(N)(T )− Θˆ1δx0(T )〉
}
,
1
2
δJj(δui) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δxj −Θδx(N) −Θ1δx0〉dt
+ 〈G(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δxj(T )− Θˆδx(N)(T )− Θˆ1δx0(T )〉
}
,
respectively. Consequently, we have the variation of the social cost functional as:
1
2
δJ (N)soc (δui) =
1
2
[
αNδJ0(δui) +
∑
j 6=i
δJj(δui) + δJi(δui)
]
= E
{∫ T
0
αN〈Q0(x¯0 −Θ0x¯(N) − η0), δx0〉 − αN〈ΘT0 Q0(x¯0 −Θ0x¯(N) − η0), δx(N)〉+ 〈Q(x¯i −Θx¯(N)
−Θ1x¯0 − η), δxi〉 − 〈ΘTQ(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx(N)〉 − 〈ΘT1 Q(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx0〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉+
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δxj〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΘTQ(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx(N)〉
−
∑
j 6=i
〈ΘT1 Q(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx0〉dt+ αN〈G0(x¯0(T )− Θˆ0x¯(N)(T )− ηˆ0), δx0(T )〉
− αN〈ΘˆT0 G0(x¯0(T )− Θˆ0x¯(N)(T )− ηˆ0), δx(N)(T )〉+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δxi(T )〉
− 〈ΘˆTG(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx(N)(T )〉 − 〈ΘˆT1 G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ),
δx0(T )〉+
∑
j 6=i
〈G(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δxj(T )〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΘˆTG(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )
− ηˆ), δx(N)(T )〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΘˆT1 G(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx0(T )〉
}
.
(4)
When N →∞, it follows that
1
2
δJ (N)soc (δui) = E
{∫ T
0
α〈Q0(x¯0 −Θ0x¯(N) − η0), Nδx0〉 − α〈ΘT0 Q0(x¯0 −Θ0x¯(N) − η0), Nδx(N)〉
+ 〈Q(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉+ 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
Q(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), Nδxj〉
− 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΘTQ(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), Nδx(N)〉 − 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΘT1 Q(x¯j −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η),
Nδx0〉dt+ α〈G0(x¯0(T )− Θˆ0x¯(N)(T )− ηˆ0), Nδx0(T )〉 − α〈ΘˆT0 G0(x¯0(T )− Θˆ0x¯(N)(T )− ηˆ0),
Nδx(N)(T )〉+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δxi(T )〉+ 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
G(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )
− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), Nδxj(T )〉 − 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΘˆTG(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), Nδx(N)(T )〉
− 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΘˆT1 G(x¯j(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), Nδx0(T )〉
}
+ o(1).
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Note that E sup0≤t≤T ‖δx0‖2 = O( 1N2 ), E sup0≤t≤T ‖δx(N)‖2 = O( 1N2 ) and 〈ΘTQ(x¯i − Θx¯(N) − Θ1x¯0 −
η), δx(N)〉 + 〈ΘT1 Q(x¯i − Θx¯(N) − Θ1x¯0 − η), δx0〉 + 〈ΘˆTG(x¯i(T ) − Θˆx¯(N)(T ) − Θˆ1x¯0(T ) − ηˆ), δx(N)(T )〉 +
〈ΘˆT1 G(x¯i(T ) − Θˆx¯(N)(T ) − Θˆ1x¯0(T ) − ηˆ), δx0(T )〉 = o(1) (the rigorous proof will be shown in Section 5).
Let 
δx†0 = lim
N→+∞
(Nδx0),
δx† = lim
N→+∞
(Nδxj) = lim
N→+∞
(
∑
j 6=i
δxj), j 6= i. (5)
Here Nδx0 converges to δx
†
0 such that E
∫ T
0
‖Nδx0 − δx†0‖2 = O( 1N2 ). Similarly,
∑
j 6=i δxj and Nδxj converge
to δx† (see Section 5 for the detailed proof). Then one can obtain
{
dδx†0 = (A0δx
†
0 + C0δxi + C0δx
†)dt, δx†0(0) = 0,
dδx† = (Aδx† + Cδxi + Cδx† + Fδx
†
0)dt, δx
†(0) = 0.
(6)
When N →∞, by mean field approximation, we use xˆ to approximate x¯(N). Note that xˆ will be affected by u0
which is given by the leader. Moreover, the influence of individual follower on xˆ may be negligible. Hence, by
straightforward computation, we simplified the social cost functional as follows:
1
2
δJ (N)soc (δui) = E
{∫ T
0
〈αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3, δx†0〉+ 〈QΨi2 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1, δxi〉
+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉+ 〈QΨ3 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1, δx†〉dt+ 〈αG0Ψ4(T )
− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T ), δx†0(T )〉+ 〈GΨ6(T )− ΘˆTGΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ),
δx†(T )〉+ 〈GΨi5(T )− ΘˆTGΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ), δxi(T )〉
}
,
(7)
where {
Ψ1(·) := x¯0 −Θ0xˆ− η0, Ψi2(·) := x¯i −Θxˆ−Θ1x¯0 − η,
Ψ3(·) := (I −Θ)xˆ−Θ1x¯0 − η,
are related to time t, and{
Ψ4(T ) := x¯0(T )− Θˆ0xˆ(T )− ηˆ0, Ψi5(T ) := x¯i(T )− Θˆxˆ(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ,
Ψ6(T ) := (I − Θˆ)xˆ(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ,
are related to time T which are terminal terms.
It is very important to formulate an auxiliary control problem to obtain the decentralized optimal control
for analyzing the problem of social optimality. Usually, an auxiliary control problem is a standard LQ control
problem (see [22, 40]). However, (7) contains δx†0 and δx
†, which are the terms we do not want them appear
in the social cost functional. Therefore, we need to use a duality procedure (see [44, Chapter 3]) to get off the
dependence of δJ (N)soc (δui) on δx†0 and δx†. To this end, we introduce two auxiliary equations{
dk1 = α1dt+ β1dW0, k1(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T ),
dk2 = α2dt+ β2dW0, k2(T ) = (I − ΘˆT )GΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ).
(8)
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Using Itoˆ formula, we have the following duality relations
E〈αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T ), δx†0(T )〉
= E〈k1(0), δx†0(0)〉+ E
∫ T
0
〈k1, A0δx†0 + C0δxi + C0δx†〉+ 〈α1, δx†0〉dt,
E〈(I − ΘˆT )GΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ), δx†(T )〉
= E〈k2(0), δx†(0)〉+ E
∫ T
0
〈k2, Aδx† + Cδxi + Cδx† + Fδx†0〉+ 〈α2, δx†〉dt.
(9)
Putting (7) and (9) together, we obtain
1
2
δJ (N)soc (δui) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Ru¯i, δui〉+ 〈αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3 + α1 + FT k2 +AT0 k1, δx†0〉
+ 〈QΨ3 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2 + α2 +AT k2, δx†〉
+ 〈QΨi2 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2, δxi〉dt
+ 〈GΨi5(T )− ΘˆTGΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ), δxi(T )〉
}
.
Comparing the coefficients, it follows that{
α1 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3 + FT k2 +AT0 k1),
α2 = −(QΨ3 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2 +AT k2).
Then, according to above discussion, the two auxiliary equations can be rewritten as:
dk1 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3 + FT k2 +AT0 k1)dt+ β1dW0,
dk2 = −(QΨ3 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2 +AT k2)dt+ β2dW0,
k1(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T ), k2(T ) = (I − ΘˆT )GΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ),
and the variation of social cost functional is equivalent to
1
2
δJ (N)soc (δui) = E
{∫ T
0
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉+ 〈−Q(Θxˆ+ Θ1x¯0 + η)
−ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2, δxi〉dt+ 〈Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )〉
+ 〈−G(Θˆxˆ(T ) + Θˆ1x¯0(T ) + ηˆ)− ΘˆTGΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ), δxi(T )〉
}
.
(10)
2.2. Decentralized strategy design for followers
As discussed in previous subsection, when N is sufficiently large, a stochastic process xˆ can be used to
approximate x(N). Now, we can introduce the following auxiliary control problem for the ith follower.
Problem 2.1. (P2) Minimize Jˆi((u0, xˆ);ui) over ui ∈ Ui, where
dxi = [Axi +Bui + Cxˆ+ Fx¯0(u0)]dt+DdWi, xi(0) = ξi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (11)
Jˆi((u0, xˆ);ui) = E
{∫ T
0
‖xi‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R + 2〈χ1, xi〉dt+ ‖xi(T )‖2G + 2〈χ2, xi(T )〉
}
, (12)
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with {
χ1 = −Q(Θxˆ+ Θ1x¯0(u0) + η)−ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2,
χ2 = −G(Θˆxˆ(T ) + Θˆ1x¯0(u0)(T ) + ηˆ)− ΘˆTGΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ).
Here, x¯0(u0) means x¯0 is related to u0. x¯0, xˆ, k1 and k2 are determined by
dx¯0 = [A0x¯0 +B0u0 + C0xˆ]dt+D0dW0, x¯0(0) = ξ0,
dxˆ = [Axˆ+Buˆ+ Cxˆ+ Fx¯0(u0)]dt, xˆ(0) = ξˆ,
dk1 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3 + FT k2 +AT0 k1)dt+ β1dW0,
dk2 = −(QΨ3 −ΘTQΨ3 − αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 + CT0 k1 + CT k2 +AT k2)dt+ β2dW0,
k1(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T ), k2(T ) = (I − ΘˆT )GΨ6(T )− αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ),
(13)
where xˆ and uˆ are the approximations of x(N) and 1N
∑N
i=1 ui, respectively.
In what follows, we let u¯ = M(u0) = {u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N} ∈ U . Note that u¯ here represents the decentraliezd
optimal control, which is different from the same notation in the beginning of Section 2.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that (A1)-(A3) hold. For given u0 ∈ U0, (P2) has a unique optimal control
u¯i = −R−1BT pi,
where pi is an adaptive solution to the following backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
dpi = −(AT pi +Qx¯i + χ1)dt+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi, pi(T ) = Gx¯i(T ) + χ2.
Proof. The variation of the state equation in (11) is
dδxi = (Aδxi +Bδui)dt, δxi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
and the variation of the corresponding cost functional is
1
2
δJˆi((u0, xˆ);ui) = E
{∫ T
0
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉+ 〈χ1, δxi〉dt+ 〈Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )〉+ 〈χ2, δxi(T )〉
}
. (14)
Using a similar argument from (8) to (10), we construct the following auxiliary equation
dpi = θidt+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi, pi(T ) = Gx¯i(T ) + χ2, (15)
and have the following duality relation between pi and δxi by using Itoˆ formula
E〈pi(T ), δxi(T )〉 =E〈pi(0), δxi(0)〉+ E
∫ T
0
〈AT pi + θi, δxi〉+ 〈BT pi, δui〉dt.
For given u0 ∈ U0, since Q ≥ 0 and R > δI, for some δ > 0, (12) is uniformly convex and it has a unique
optimal control. Let (14) equal zero, we have
θi = −(AT pi +Qx¯i + χ1), u¯i = −R−1BT pi. (16)
Then, the proposition follows. 
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Substituting (16) into (11) and (15), we have the following FBSDE
{
dx¯i = [Ax¯i −BR−1BT pi + Cxˆ+ Fx¯0]dt+DdWi, xi(0) = ξi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
dpi = −(AT pi +Qx¯i + χ1)dt+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi, pi(T ) = Gxi(T ) + χ2.
(17)
By taking limits, the above FBSDE can be rewritten as:
{
dxˆ = [(A+ C)xˆ+ Fx¯0 −BR−1BT pˆ]dt, xˆ(0) = ξˆ,
dpˆ = −(AT pˆ+Qxˆ+ χ1)dt+ ζ0dW0, pˆ(T ) = Gxˆ(T ) + χ2.
(18)
2.3. The consistency condition of the follower problem
Let 
Ξ1 := (I −ΘT )Q(I −Θ) + αΘT0 Q0Θ0, ΞG1 := (I − ΘˆT )G(I − Θˆ) + αΘˆT0 G0Θˆ0,
Ξ2 := (I −ΘT )QΘ1 + αΘT0 Q0, ΞG2 := (I − ΘˆT )GΘˆ1 + αΘˆT0 G0,
Ξ3 := (I −ΘT )Qη − αΘT0 Q0η0, ΞG3 := (I − ΘˆT )Gηˆ − αΘˆT0 G0ηˆ0,
Ξ4 := Θ
T
1 QΘ1 + αQ0, Ξ
G
4 := Θˆ
T
1 GΘˆ1 + αG0,
Ξ5 := Θ
T
1 Qη − αQ0η0, ΞG5 := ΘˆT1 Gηˆ − αG0ηˆ0.
Combining (13) and (18), we can obtain the CC system

dxˆ = [(A+ C)xˆ+ Fx¯0 −BR−1BT k2]dt, xˆ(0) = ξˆ,
dx¯0 = [A0x¯0 +B0u0 + C0xˆ]dt+D0dW0, x¯0(0) = ξ0,
dk1 = −[Ξ4x¯0 − ΞT2 xˆ+AT0 k1 + FT k2 + Ξ5]dt+ β1dW0,
dk2 = −[Ξ1xˆ− Ξ2x¯0 + CT0 k1 + (A+ C)T k2 − Ξ3]dt+ β2dW0,
k1(T ) = Ξ
G
4 x¯0(T )− (ΞG2 )T xˆ(T ) + ΞG5 , k2(T ) = ΞG1 xˆ(T )− ΞG2 x¯0(T )− ΞG3 ,
(19)
where pˆ = k2 can be easily verified.
3. The optimal control problem for the leader
Now, let (P2) have a unique solution. Then, for u0 ∈ U0 given by leader, the followers choose their optimal
control u¯ = M(u0) = {u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N} ∈ U , where u¯i is shown in (16). Now we consider the optimal control
of the leader to further minimize the social cost functional. In the infinite population system, x(N) may be
approximated by xˆ. Hence, we can construct the following auxiliary optimal control problem for the leader.
Problem 3.1. (P3) Minimize Jˆ (N)soc (u0; u¯) over u0 ∈ U0, where
dx0 = [A0x0 +B0u0 + C0xˆ]dt+D0dW0, x0(0) = ξ0,
Jˆ (N)soc (u0; u¯) = αN Jˆ0(u0; u¯) +
N∑
i=1
Jˆi(u0; u¯).
(20)
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(P3) is based on (P2). Therefore, combining (16), the equations below (7) and the equations (2), (3) with
mean field approximations, the cost functionals of the leader and the ith follower are
Jˆ0(u0; u¯) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Q0Ψ1,Ψ1〉+ 〈R0u0, u0〉dt+ 〈G0Ψ4,Ψ4〉
}
,
Jˆi(u0; u¯) =E
{∫ T
0
〈QΨi2,Ψi2〉+ 〈BT pi, R−1BT pi〉dt+ 〈GΨi5,Ψi5〉
}
,
where xˆ, x¯0, k1, k2, x¯i, pi are determined by (19) and (17).
Using a similar argument in Section 2, we let u¯0 be the optimal strategy of the leader and perturb u0 in (20),
where δu0 = u0− u¯0. Since x¯0, xˆ, x¯i and pi are determined by u0, we denote their corresponding perturbations
as: δx¯0 = x¯0(u0) − x¯0(u¯0), δxˆ = xˆ(u0) − xˆ(u¯0), δx¯i = x¯i(u0) − x¯i(u¯0) and δpi = pi(u0) − pi(u¯0). For sake of
notation simplicity, we drop (u¯0) in the following x¯0(u¯0), xˆ(u¯0), x¯i(u¯0) and pi(u¯0), etc. Then, one can obtain
dδx¯0 = [A0δx¯0 +B0δu0 + C0δxˆ]dt, δx¯0(0) = 0,
and the variations of corresponding cost functionals
1
2
δJˆ0(δu0) =E
{∫ T
0
〈Q0Ψ1, δx¯0 −Θ0δxˆ〉+ 〈R0u¯0, δu0〉dt+ 〈G0Ψ4, δx¯0(T )− Θˆ0δxˆ(T )〉
}
,
1
2
N∑
i=1
δJˆi(δu0) =
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈QΨi2, δx¯i −Θδxˆ−Θ1δx¯0〉+ 〈R−1BT pi, BT δpi〉dt
+ 〈GΨi5, δx¯i(T )− Θˆδxˆ(T )− Θˆ1δx¯0(T )〉
}
.
Here Ψ1, Ψ
i
2, Ψ4(T ), Ψ
i
5(T ), are related to u¯0. In what follows, Ψ1, Ψ
i
2, Ψ3, Ψ4(T ), Ψ
i
5(T ), Ψ6(T ) will be
related to u¯0. Therefore, the variation of the social cost functional is
1
2
δJˆ (N)soc (δu0)
=αNE
∫ T
0
〈Q0Ψ1, δx¯0〉 − 〈ΘT0 Q0Ψ1, δxˆ〉+ 〈R0u¯0, δu0〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈QΨi2, δx¯i〉 − 〈ΘTQΨi2, δxˆ〉 − 〈ΘT1 QΨi2, δx¯0〉+ 〈BR−1BT pi, δpi〉dt
+ αN〈G0Ψ4(T ), δx¯0(T )〉 − αN〈ΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ), δxˆ(T )〉 −
N∑
i=1
〈ΘˆT1 GΨi5(T ), δx¯0(T )〉
−
N∑
i=1
〈ΘˆTGΨi5(T ), δxˆ(T )〉+
N∑
i=1
〈GΨi5(T ), δx¯i(T )〉.
(21)
Similarly, the variations of those equations in (17) and (19) are given by
dδx¯i = [Aδx¯i −BR−1BT δpi + Cδxˆ+ Fδx¯0]dt, δx¯i(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
dδpi = −(AT δpi +Qδxi + [Ξ1 −Q]δxˆ− Ξ2δx¯0 + CT0 δk1 + CT δk2)dt+ δζ0dW0 + δζidWi,
δpi(T ) = Gδxi(T ) + [Ξ
G
1 −G]δxˆ(T )− ΞG2 δx¯0(T ),
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and

dδxˆ = [(A+ C)δxˆ+ Fδx¯0 −BR−1BT δk2]dt, δxˆ(0) = 0,
dδk1 = −[Ξ4δx¯0 − ΞT2 δxˆ+AT0 δk1 + FT δk2]dt+ δβ1dW0,
dδk2 = −[Ξ1δxˆ− Ξ2δx¯0 + CT0 δk1 + (A+ C)T δk2]dt+ δβ2dW0,
δk1(T ) = Ξ
G
4 δx¯0(T )− (ΞG2 )T δxˆ(T ), δk2(T ) = ΞG1 δxˆ(T )− ΞG2 δx¯0(T ).
Since (21) contains many terms that we do not want them appear in the social cost functional, we will use a
similar argument in Section 2 to get off the dependence of δJˆ (N)soc (δu0) on those terms. Therefore, we need to
construct six auxiliary equations to help us obtain the optimal control of the leader. We introduce the first
three auxiliary equations:

dqi = midt+ n
0
i dW0 + nidWi, qi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
dl1 = s1dt+ r1dW0, l1(0) = 0,
dl2 = s2dt+ r2dW0, l2(0) = 0.
Here qi, l1 and l2 are used to free δJˆ (N)soc (δu0) from the dependence on pi, k1 and k2, respectively. By a similar
argument from (8) to (10), we can rewrite the variation of the social cost functional as follows:
1
2
δJˆ (N)soc (δu0)
= E
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
〈αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨi2, δx¯0〉+
N∑
i=1
〈−αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 −ΘTQΨi2, δxˆ〉+
N∑
i=1
〈QΨi2, δx¯i〉
+N〈αR0u¯0, δu0〉+
N∑
i=1
〈BR−1BT pi, δpi〉+
N∑
i=1
〈l1,−(AT0 δk1 + FT δk2 + Ξ4δx¯0 − ΞT2 δxˆ)〉
+
N∑
i=1
〈s1, δk1〉+
N∑
i=1
〈s2, δk2〉+
N∑
i=1
〈l2,−((A+ C)T δk2 + CT0 δk1 + Ξ1δxˆ− Ξ2δx¯0)〉
+
N∑
i=1
〈−(AT δpi +Qδx¯i + [Ξ1 −Q]δxˆ− Ξ2δx¯0 + CT0 δk1 + CT δk2), qi〉+
N∑
i=1
〈δpi,mi〉
+
N∑
i=1
[〈δβ1, r1〉+ 〈δβ2, r2〉] +
N∑
i=1
[〈δζ0, n0i 〉+ 〈δζi, ni〉]dt+
N∑
i=1
〈GΨi5(T )−Gqi(T ), δx¯i(T )〉
+
N∑
i=1
〈αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨi5(T )− (ΞG4 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG2 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG2 )T qi(T ), δx¯0(T )〉
−
N∑
i=1
〈αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ) + ΘˆTGΨi5(T )− (ΞG2 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG1 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG1 −G)T qi(T ), δxˆ(T )〉.
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Next, we introduce another three auxiliary equations:

dyˆi = αˆdt+ βˆdW0 +
N∑
i=1
βˆidWi,
yˆi(T ) = αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ) + Θˆ
TGΨi5(T )− (ΞG2 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG1 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG1 −G)T qi(T ),
dyi0 = αˆ0dt+ βˆ0dW0 +
N∑
i=1
βˆ0i dWi,
yi0(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨi5(T )− (ΞG4 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG2 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG2 )T qi(T ),
dyi = αidt+ β0dW0 + βidWi, yi(T ) = GΨ
i
5(T )−Gqi(T ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Here yˆi, yi0 and yi are used to free δJˆ (N)soc (δu0) from the dependence on δxˆ, δx¯0 and δx¯i, respectively. Similarly,
by Itoˆ formula and the duality relations, the variation of the social cost functional can be further rewritten as
follows:
1
2
δJˆ (N)soc (δu0)
=E
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
〈αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨi2 + FT yi − FT yˆi +AT0 yi0 + αˆ0 − ΞT4 l1 + ΞT2 l2
+ ΞT2 qi, δx¯0〉+
N∑
i=1
〈−αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 −ΘTQΨi2 + CT yi − (A+ C)T yˆi + CT0 yi0
− αˆ+ Ξ2l1 − ΞT1 l2 − (Ξ1 −Q)T qi, δxˆ〉+
N∑
i=1
〈QΨi2 +AT yi + αi −Qqi, δx¯i〉
+
N∑
i=1
〈BR−1BT pi −BR−1BT yi +mi −Aqi, δpi〉+
N∑
i=1
[〈ni, δζi〉+ 〈n0i , δζ0〉]
+
N∑
i=1
〈s1 − C0l2 −A0l1 + C0qi, δk1〉+
N∑
i=1
〈s2 − (A+ C)l2 +BR−1BT yˆi − Fl1
+ Cqi, δk2〉+
N∑
i=1
[〈r1, δβ1〉+ 〈r2, δβ2〉] + 〈αNR0u¯0 +
N∑
i=1
BT0 y
i
0, δu0〉dt.
Using a similar discussion in Proposition 2.1 and comparing the coeffcients, we have

αˆ0 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨi2 + FT yi − FT yˆi +AT0 yi0 − ΞT4 l1 + ΞT2 l2 + ΞT2 qi),
αˆ = −αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 −ΘTQΨi2 + CT yi − (A+ C)T yˆi + CT0 yi0 + Ξ2l1 − ΞT1 l2 − (Ξ1 −Q)T qi,
αi = −(QΨi2 +AT yi −QT qi), mi = −(BR−1BT pi −BR−1BT yi −Aqi),
s1 = C0l2 +A0l1 − C0qi, s2 = (A+ C)l2 −BR−1BT yˆi + Fl1 − Cqi,
ni = 0, n
0
i = 0, r1 = 0, r2 = 0.
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Then, we have following FBSDE

dyi = −(AT yi −QT qi +QΨi2)dt+ β0dW0 + βidWi, yi(T ) = GΨi5(T )−Gqi(T ),
dqi = (BR
−1BT yi +Aqi −BR−1BT pi)dt, qi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
dyˆi = (−αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 −ΘTQΨi2 + CT yi − (A+ C)T yˆi + CT0 yi0 + Ξ2l1 − ΞT1 l2
− (Ξ1 −Q)T qi)dt+ βˆdW0 +
N∑
i=1
βˆidWi,
yˆi(T ) = αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ) + Θˆ
TGΨi5(T )− (ΞG2 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG1 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG1 −G)T qi(T ),
dyi0 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨi2 + FT yi − FT yˆi +AT0 yi0 − ΞT4 l1 + ΞT2 l2 + ΞT2 qi)dt
+ βˆ0dW0 +
N∑
i=1
βˆ0i dWi,
yi0(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨi5(T )− (ΞG4 )T l1(T ) + (ΞG2 )T l2(T ) + (ΞG2 )T qi(T ),
dl1 = (A0l1 + C0l2 − C0qi)dt, l1(0) = 0,
dl2 = [Fl1 + (A+ C)l2 −BR−1BT yˆi − Cqi]dt, l2(0) = 0,
(22)
with the centralized form of the optimal control for the leader
u¯0 = −α
−1
N
R−10 B
T
0
N∑
i=1
yi0 := u
(N)
0 . (23)
Note that u¯0 relies on N . Denote

y∗ = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi, yˆ
∗ = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
yˆi, y∗0 = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi0,
q∗ = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi, l
∗
1 = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
l1, l
∗
2 = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
l2.
Here, using a similar argument of (5), we can easily prove that 1N
∑N
i=1 yi,
1
N
∑N
i=1 yˆ
i, 1N
∑N
i=1 y
i
0,
1
N
∑N
i=1 qi,
1
N
∑N
i=1 l1 and
1
N
∑N
i=1 l2 converge to y
∗, yˆ∗, y∗0 , q
∗, l∗1 and l
∗
2, respectively. Thus, combining (19) and (22),
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when N →∞, we can obtain the CC system for the leader-follower problem
dxˆ = [(A+ C)xˆ+ Fx¯0 −BR−1BT k2]dt, xˆ(0) = ξˆ,
dx¯0 = [A0x¯0 + C0xˆ−B0(αR0)−1BT0 y∗0 ]dt+D0dW0, x¯0(0) = ξ0,
dk1 = −[Ξ4x¯0 − ΞT2 xˆ+AT0 k1 + FT k2 + Ξ5]dt+ β1dW0,
dk2 = −[Ξ1xˆ− Ξ2x¯0 + CT0 k1 + (A+ C)T k2 − Ξ3]dt+ β2dW0,
k1(T ) = Ξ
G
4 x¯0(T )− (ΞG2 )T xˆ(T ) + ΞG5 , k2(T ) = ΞG1 xˆ(T )− ΞG2 x¯0(T )− ΞG3 ,
dy∗ = −(AT y∗ −QT q∗ +QΨ3)dt+ β∗dW0, y∗(T ) = GΨ6(T )−Gq∗(T ),
dq∗ = (BR−1BT y∗ +Aq∗ −BR−1BT k2)dt, q∗(0) = 0,
dyˆ∗ = [−αΘT0 Q0Ψ1 −ΘTQΨ3 + CT y∗ − (A+ C)T yˆ∗ + CT0 y∗0 + Ξ2l∗1 − ΞT1 l∗2
− (Ξ1 −Q)T q∗]dt+ βˆ∗dW0,
yˆ∗(T ) = αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4(T ) + Θˆ
TGΨ6(T )− (ΞG2 )T l∗1(T ) + (ΞG1 )T l∗2(T ) + (ΞG1 −G)T q∗(T ),
dy∗0 = −(αQ0Ψ1 −ΘT1 QΨ3 + FT y∗ − FT yˆ∗ +AT0 y∗0 − ΞT4 l∗1 + ΞT2 l∗2 + ΞT2 q∗)dt
+ βˆ∗0dW0,
y∗0(T ) = αG0Ψ4(T )− ΘˆT1 GΨ6(T )− (ΞG4 )T l∗1(T ) + (ΞG2 )T l∗2(T ) + (ΞG2 )T q∗(T ),
dl∗1 = (A0l
∗
1 + C0l
∗
2 − C0q∗)dt, l∗1(0) = 0,
dl∗2 = [Fl
∗
1 + (A+ C)l
∗
2 −BR−1BT yˆ∗ − Cq∗]dt, l∗2(0) = 0.
(24)
and the decentralized optimal control for the leader
u∗0 = −(αR0)−1BT0 y∗0 . (25)
The final CC system is highly coupled with five forward equations and five backward equations. The existence
and uniqueness of (24) is very important for obtaining the optimal control, however it is very difficult to solve
such high-dimensional system. We need to simplify the CC system to a FBSDE using block matrices and these
will be discussed in next section.
4. Well-posedness of the CC system
Note that in (24), the equations of (xˆ, x¯0, k1, k2) form a coupled FBSDE and (y
∗, q∗, yˆ∗, y∗0 , l
∗
1, l
∗
2) form another
coupled FBSDE. The two FBSDEs are also fully coupled with each other. Therefore, we try to look at the
above FBSDEs in a different way. To this end, we set
X =

xˆ
x¯0
q∗
l∗1
l∗2
 , Y =

y∗
yˆ∗
y∗0
k1
k2
 , X(0) =

ξˆ
ξ0
0
0
0
 ,Y(T ) =

GΨ6 −Gq∗(T )
αΘˆT0 G0Ψ4 − ΘˆTGΨ6 − (ΞG2 )T l∗1(T ) + (ΞG1 )T l∗2(T ) + (ΞG1 −G)T q∗(T )
αG0Ψ4 − ΘˆT1 GΨ6 − (ΞG4 )T l∗1(T ) + (ΞG2 )T l∗2(T ) + (ΞG2 )T q∗(T )
ΞG4 x¯0(T )− (ΞG2 )T xˆ(T ) + ΞG5
ΞG1 xˆ(T )− ΞG2 x¯0(T )− ΞG3
 .
Then (24) is equivalent to{
dX = [AX+ BY+ b]dt+ DdW0, X(0) = (ξˆT ξT0 0 0 0)T ,
dY = [AˆX+ BˆY+ bˆ]dt+ DˆdW0, Y(T ) = GX(T ) + g,
(26)
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with
A =

A+ C F 0 0 0
C0 A0 0 0 0
0 0 A 0 0
0 0 −C0 A0 C0
0 0 −C F (A+ C)
 , B =

0 0 0 0 −BR−1BT
0 0 −B0(αR0)−1BT0 0 0
BR−1BT 0 0 0 −BR−1BT
0 0 0 0 0
0 −BR−1BT 0 0 0
 ,
b =

0
0
0
0
0
 , D =

0
D0
0
0
0
 , Aˆ =

−Q(I −Θ) QΘ1 QT 0 0
Ξ1 −Q(I −Θ) −Ξ2 +QΘ1 −(Ξ1 −Q)T Ξ2 −ΞT1
ΞT2 −Ξ4 −ΞT2 ΞT4 −ΞT2
ΞT2 −Ξ4 0 0 0
−Ξ1 Ξ2 0 0 0
 ,
bˆ =

Qη
−Ξ3 +Qη
−Ξ5
−Ξ5
Ξ3
 , Dˆ =

β∗
βˆ∗
βˆ∗0
β1
β2
 , Bˆ =

−AT 0 0 0 0
CT −(A+ C)T CT0 0 0
−FT FT −AT0 0 0
0 0 0 −AT0 −FT
0 0 0 −CT0 −(A+ C)T
 ,
g =

−Gηˆ
ΞG3 −Gηˆ
ΞG5
ΞG5
−ΞG3
 , G =

G(I − Θˆ) −GΘˆ1 −G 0 0
−ΞG1 +G(I − Θˆ) ΞG2 −GΘˆ1 (ΞG1 −G)T −(ΞG2 )T (ΞG1 )T
−(ΞG2 )T ΞG4 (ΞG2 )T −(ΞG4 )T (ΞG2 )T
−(ΞG2 )T ΞG4 0 0 0
ΞG1 −ΞG2 0 0 0
 .
Denote
A¯ =
(
A B
Aˆ Bˆ
)
, b¯ =
(
b
bˆ
)
, D¯ =
(
D
Dˆ
)
.
Then (26) can be rewritten as: d
(
X
Y
)
=
{
A¯
(
X
Y
)
+ b¯
}
dt+ D¯dW0,
X(0) = (ξˆT ξT0 0 0 0)T , Y(T ) = GX(T ) + g.
(27)
This is a fully coupled FBSDE. From the Theorem 3.7 of Chapter 2 in [28], the FBSDE (26) is solvable for all
g ∈ L2F(Ω;R5n) if and only if the following condition holds:
det
{
(0, I)eA¯t
(
0
I
)}
> 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (28)
In the case, (26) admits an unique solution for any given g ∈ L2F(Ω;R5n).
Under the condition (28), we may decouple the FBSDE (26) by
Y = KX+ κ, t ∈ [0, T ],
where K ∈ C1([0, T ]; S5n) is a solution of the following Ricatti equation
K˙+KA+KBK− BˆK− Aˆ = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], K(T ) = G,
and κ ∈ C1([0, T ];R5n) satisfies
κ˙+ (KB− Bˆ)κ+Kb− bˆ = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], κ(T ) = g. (29)
TITLE WILL BE SET BY THE PUBLISHER 17
By the Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 4.3 of Chapter 2 in [28], if (28) hold, then the Ricatti equation admits a
unique solution K(·) which has the following representation:
K = −
[
(0, I)eA¯(T−t)
(
0
I
)]−1[
(0, I)eA¯(T−t)
(
I
0
)]
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (30)
Example 4.1. Consider the system (26) with parameters A0 = 0.1, B0 = 1, C0 = 0.01, D0 = 1, A = 0.05,
B = 1, C = 0.05, D = 1, F = 0.3, Θ0 = 1, Q0 = 1, R0 = 10, G0 = 0, Θ = 0.1, Θ1 = 1, Q = 0.9, R = 15, G = 0,
α = 1.02, T = 12, η0 = η = 0. Then, we have
A =

0.10 0.30 0 0 0
0.01 0.10 0 0 0
0 0 0.05 0 0
0 0 −0.01 0.10 0.01
0 0 −0.05 0.30 0.10
,B =

0 0 0 0 −0.0667
0 0 −0.0980 0 0
0.0667 0 0 0 −0.0667
0 0 0 0 0
0 −0.0667 0 0 0
,
Aˆ =

−0.81 0.90 0.90 0 0
0.939 −0.93 −2.649 1.83 −1.749
1.83 −1.92 −1.83 1.92 −1.83
1.83 −1.92 0 0 0
−1.749 1.83 0 0 0
, Bˆ =

−0.05 0 0 0 0
0.05 −0.10 0.01 0 0
−0.30 0.30 −0.10 0 0
0 0 0 −0.10 −0.30
0 0 0 −0.01 −0.10
.
Hence, according to the simulation through Matlab software, for any t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain
A¯ =
(
A B
Aˆ Bˆ
)
, det
{
(0, I)eA¯t
(
0
I
)}
> 0,
(e.g. for t = 6, det
{
(0, I)eA¯t
(
0
I
)}
= 12.7053 > 0). By the argument above, FBSDE (26) is solvable.
For further analysis, we make the following assumption:
(A4) The equation (27) has a unique solution and the solution (X,Y, D¯) belongs to M[0, T ].
For the following equation{
dx¯i = [Ax¯i −BR−1BT pi + Cxˆ+ Fx¯0]dt+DdWi, xi(0) = ξi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
dpi = −[AT pi +Qx¯i + χ1]dt+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi, pi(T ) = Gxi(T ) + χ2,
(31)
where χ1 and χ2 are related to u¯0. We let pi = P¯ x¯i + ϕ¯, t ∈ [0, T ], where P¯ ∈ C1([0, T ];Sn) is a solution of the
following Ricatti equation and ϕ¯ ∈ C1([0, T ];Rn) satisfies{
˙¯P + P¯A− P¯BR−1BT P¯ +AT P¯ +Q = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], P¯ (T ) = G,
˙¯ϕ+ (AT − P¯BR−1BT )ϕ¯+ χ1 + P¯Cxˆ+ P¯F x¯0 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ¯(T ) = χ2.
Since the Ricatti equation is standard, it has a unique solution. Hence, the FBSDE (31) is uniquely solvable
and the solution belongs to M[0, T ].
5. Asymptotically social optimality
In this section, we discuss that if the leader announces u∗0 obtained in (25) to the N followers, then the set of
the optimal decentralized controls for the leader and the followers will constitutes an approximated Stackelberg
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equilibrium. First, for the open-loop decentralized strategy (u∗0, u
∗) in (25) and (16), we have the realized
decentralized state x∗0 and x
∗
i , satisfies
dx∗0(t) = [A0x
∗
0(t)−B0(αR0)−1BT0 y∗0(t) + C0(x∗)(N)(t)]dt+D0dW0(t),
dx∗i (t) = [Ax
∗
i (t)−BR−1BT pi(t) + C(x∗)(N)(t) + Fx∗0(t)]dt+DdWi(t),
x∗0(0) = ξ0, x
∗
i (0) = ξi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
(32)
where y∗0 , pi satisfy (24) and (31), respectively. Then, by [2] and [31], we give the definition of the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Definition 5.1. A set of control laws M(uˇ0) ∈ U has asymptotic social optimality if∣∣∣∣ 1N J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0))− 1N inf(uˇ0,uˇ)∈Uc J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ)
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N ),
where M is a mapping and M : U0 → U . Uc is defined in Section 2 as a set of centralized information-based
control.
Definition 5.2. A set of control laws (u∗0, u
∗) ∈ U0×U , where u∗ =M(u∗0), is an Stackelberg equilibrium with
respect to J (N)soc (u0, u) if the following two properties hold:
(1) M(uˇ0) has asymptotic social optimality under uˇ0.
(2) The following equation is satisfied∣∣∣∣ 1N J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))− 1N infuˇ0∈Uc J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0))
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N ).
We first need to introduce some lemmas before proving the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Lemma 5.3. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Then
E
∫ T
0
‖(x∗)(N) − xˆ‖2dt+ E
∫ T
0
‖p(N) − pˆ‖2dt+ E
∫ T
0
‖x∗0 − x¯0‖2dt = O(
1
N
).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 5.4. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. There exists a constant K, which is independent of N , such that
J (N)soc (u∗0;u∗) ≤ NK.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Proposition 5.5. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. For all (uˇ0; uˇ) ∈ Uc, there exists a constant K, which is
independent of N , such that
αN‖uˇ0‖2L2 + ‖uˇ‖2L2 ≤ NK.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4, we have
E
∫ T
0
αN‖uˇ0‖2 + ‖uˇ‖2dt ≤ inf
(uˇ0;uˇ)
J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ) ≤ J (N)soc (u∗0;u∗) ≤ NK, (α > 0).
Therefore, αN‖uˇ0‖2L2 + ‖uˇ‖2L2 ≤ NK, where K is independent of N . The proposition follows. 
The following two propositions will give the rigorous proofs for the approximations in Section 3.
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Proposition 5.6. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Then, for (4), E sup0≤t≤T ‖δx0‖2 = O( 1N2 ), E sup0≤t≤T ‖δx(N)‖2 =
O( 1N2 ) and 〈ΘTQ(x¯i−Θx¯(N)−Θ1x¯0−η), δx(N)〉+〈ΘT1 Q(x¯i−Θx¯(N)−Θ1x¯0−η), δx0〉+〈ΘˆTG(x¯i(T )−Θˆx¯(N)(T )−
Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx(N)(T )〉+ 〈ΘˆT1 G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx0(T )〉 = o(1).
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Proposition 5.7. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Then, Nδxj, Nδx0, Nδxj converge to
∑
j 6=i δxj, δx
†
0, δx
†
such that
E
∫ T
0
‖Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj‖2 = O( 1
N2
), E
∫ T
0
‖Nδx0 − δx†0‖2 = O(
1
N2
), E
∫ T
0
‖Nδxj − δx†‖2 = O( 1
N2
).
Proof. See Appendix C. 
By the lemmas and propositions we discussed above, we give the main result.
Theorem 5.8. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Then (u∗0, u
∗) given in (25) and (16) is an Stackelberg equilibrium
with respect to the social cost functional.
Proof. For (uˇ0; uˇ) ∈ Uc, let
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;u∗)−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ) =
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0))
+
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ) := ∆1 + ∆2,
where ∆1 =
1
NJ (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0)) − 1NJ (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)), ∆2 = 1NJ (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) − 1NJ (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ). Since uˇ0 is
fixed, by following the standard method in Huang et al [22], we obtain ‖∆2‖2 ≤ c(‖uˇ0‖2L2) 1N . Specifically, we
denote x`i as the state of the ith follower when its control is Mi(uˇ0), thus x`i is equivalent to x¯i in Section 3.
Let {
u˜0 = uˇ0 − uˇ0 = 0, u˜ = uˇ−M(uˇ0), u˜i = uˇi −Mi(uˇ0),
x˜0 = xˇ0 − x`0, x˜i = xˇi − x`i.
Then we have
J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ) = αNJ0(uˇ0; uˇ) +
N∑
i=1
Ji(uˇ0; uˇ)
=αNJ0(uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) + αNH0 + αNI0 +
N∑
i=1
Ji(uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) +
N∑
i=1
Hi +
N∑
i=1
Ii,
20 TITLE WILL BE SET BY THE PUBLISHER
where
J0(uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) = E
{∫ T
0
‖x`0 −Θ0x`(N) − η0‖2Q0 + ‖uˇ0‖2R0dt+ ‖x`0(T )− Θˆ0x`(N)(T )− ηˆ0‖2G0
}
,
H0 = E
{∫ T
0
‖x˜0 −Θ0x˜(N)‖2Q0dt+ ‖x˜0(T )− Θˆ0x˜(N)(T )‖2G0
}
,
Ji(uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) = E
{∫ T
0
‖x`i −Θx`(N) −Θ1x`0 − η‖2Q + ‖Mi(uˇ0)‖2Rdt
+ ‖x`i(T )− Θˆx`(N)(T )− Θˆ1x`0(T )− ηˆ‖2G
}
,
Hi = E
{∫ T
0
‖x˜i −Θx˜(N) −Θ1x˜0‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2Rdt+ ‖x˜i(T )− Θˆx˜(N)(T )− Θˆ1x˜0(T )‖2G
}
,
I0 = E
{∫ T
0
(x`0 −Θ0x`(N) − η0)TQ0(x˜0 −Θ0x˜(N))dt
+ (x`0(T )− Θˆ0x`(N)(T )− ηˆ0)TG0(x˜0(T )− Θˆ0x˜(N)(T ))
}
,
Ii = E
{∫ T
0
(x`i −Θx`(N) −Θ1x`0 − η)TQ(x˜i −Θx˜(N) −Θ1x˜0) +MTi (uˇ)Ru˜idt
+ (x`i(T )− Θˆx`(N)(T )− Θˆ1x`0(T )− ηˆ)TG(x˜i(T )− Θˆx˜(N)(T )− Θˆ1x˜0(T ))
}
.
By straightforward computation
αNI0 = E
{∫ T
0
αN [ΨT1 Q0 − (Θ0υ1)TQ0]x˜0 − α[ΨT1 Q0Θ0 − (Θ0υ1)TQ0Θ0]
N∑
i=1
x˜idt
+ αN [Ψ4(T )
TG0 − (Θˆ0υ1(T ))TG0]x˜0(T )− α[Ψ4(T )TG0Θˆ0 − (Θˆ0υ1(T ))TG0Θˆ0]
N∑
i=1
x˜i(T )
}
,
(33)
N∑
i=1
Ii = E
{∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(Ψi2)
TQx˜i − [(Θυ1)TQ+ ΨT3 QΘ− ((I −Θ)υ1)TQΘ]
N∑
i=1
x˜i −N [ΨT3 QΘ1
− [(I −Θ)υ1]TQΘ1]x˜0 +MTi (uˇ)Ru˜idt+
N∑
i=1
(Ψi5(T ))
TGx˜i(T )− [(Θˆυ1(T ))TG+ Ψ6(T )TGΘˆ
− ((I − Θˆ)υ1(T ))TGΘˆ]
N∑
i=1
x˜i(T )−N [Ψ6(T )TGΘˆ1 − [(I − Θˆ)υ1(T )]TGΘˆ1]x˜0(T )
}
.
(34)
where υ1 = x`
(N) − xˆ. By (24), (31) and Itoˆ formula, we obtain following relations:
N〈k1(T ), x˜0(T )〉 = 〈αNG0Ψ4, x˜0(T )〉 − 〈NΘˆT1 GΨ6, x˜0(T )〉
= E
∫ T
0
−〈αNQ0Ψ1, x˜0〉+ 〈NΘT1 QΨ3, x˜0〉 − 〈k2, NF x˜0〉+ 〈CT0 k1,
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉dt,
(35)
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and
N∑
i=1
〈pi(T ), x˜i(T )〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈ΘTQΨ3,
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉 − 〈QΨi2,
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉+ 〈αΘT0 Q0Ψ1,
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉
− 〈CT0 k1,
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉 − 〈p(N) − k2, C
N∑
i=1
x˜i〉+
N∑
i=1
〈pi, Bu˜i〉+ 〈p(N), NF x˜0〉dt.
(36)
Meanwhile, by (16), we have
N∑
i=1
〈Mi(uˇ), Ru˜i〉+
N∑
i=1
〈pi, Bu˜i〉 =
N∑
i=1
〈RMi(uˇ) +BT pi, u˜i〉 =
N∑
i=1
〈R(−R−1BT pi) +BT pi, u˜i〉 = 0. (37)
Combining (33)-(37), Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4, it follows that
1
N
(αNI0 +
N∑
i=1
Ii) = O(
1√
N
).
Moreover, 1N (αNH0 +
∑N
i=1Hi) ≥ 0. Thus, we have
∆2 =
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0; uˇ) ≤ c(‖uˇ0‖L2)
1√
N
. (38)
For ∆1, we decompose it as follows:
∆1 =
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) =
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))
− 1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 )) +
1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 ))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)).
Note that u
(N)
0 is the centralized social optimal control in (23), thus one can easily obtain that
1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 )) ≤
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)). (39)
We know that J (N)soc (u0;M(u0)) continuously depends on u0. SinceM(u0) is the solution of FBSDE (31) which
continuously depends on parameters, we have M(u0) is continuous in u0. Note that J (N)soc (u0;M(u0)) is a
quadratic functional and u∗0 is fixed. Let xˇ
(N)
0 and xˇ
(N)
i be the state of the leader and the ith follower when the
control of the leader is u
(N)
0 . Denote{
u´0 = u
(N)
0 − u∗0, δM(u0) =M(u(N)0 )−M(u∗0),
δMi(u0) =Mi(u(N)0 )−Mi(u∗0), x´0 = xˇ(N)0 − x∗0, x´i = xˇ(N)i − x∗i .
Then we have ∣∣∣∣J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 ))− J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣J (N)soc (u(N)0 − u∗0 + u∗0;M(u(N)0 )−M(u∗0) +M(u∗0))− J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))∣∣∣∣,
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and
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 )) = αN [J0(u∗0;M(u∗0)) +H ′0 + I ′0] +
N∑
i=1
[Ji(u∗0;M(u∗0)) +H ′i + I ′i],
where
J0(u∗0;M(u∗0)) = E
{∫ T
0
‖x∗0 −Θ0(x∗)(N) − η0‖2Q0 + ‖u∗0‖2R0dt+ ‖x∗0(T )− Θˆ0(x∗)(N)(T )− ηˆ0‖2G0
}
,
H ′0 = E
{∫ T
0
‖x´0 −Θ0x´(N)‖2Q0 + ‖u´0‖2R0dt+ ‖x´0(T )− Θˆ0x´(N)(T )‖2G0
}
,
Ji(u∗0;M(u∗0)) = E
{∫ T
0
‖x∗i −Θ(x∗)(N) −Θ1x∗0 − η‖2Q + ‖Mi(u∗0)‖2Rdt
+ ‖x∗i (T )− Θˆ(x∗)(N)(T )− Θˆ1x∗0(T )− ηˆ‖2G
}
,
H ′i = E
{∫ T
0
‖x´i −Θx´(N) −Θ1x´0‖2Q + ‖δMi(u0)‖2Rdt+ ‖x´i(T )− Θˆx´(N)(T )− Θˆ1x´0(T )‖2G
}
,
I ′0 = E
{∫ T
0
(x∗0 −Θ0(x∗)(N) − η0)TQ0(x´0 −Θ0x´(N))dt
+ (x∗0(T )− Θˆ0(x∗)(N)(T )− ηˆ0)TG0(x´0(T )− Θˆ0x´(N)(T ))
}
,
I ′i = E
{∫ T
0
(x∗i −Θ(x∗)(N) −Θ1x∗0 − η)TQ(x´i −Θx´(N) −Θ1x´0) +MTi (u∗0)RδMi(u0)dt
+ (x∗i (T )− Θˆ(x∗)(N)(T )− Θˆ1x∗0(T )− ηˆ)TG(x´i(T )− Θˆx´(N)(T )− Θˆ1x´0(T ))
}
.
By using similar arguments in Lemma A.1 to Lemma A.2 and ‖∆2‖2 ≤ c(‖uˇ0‖2L2) 1N , we obtain
1
N
H ′0 +
1
N
H ′i + αI
′
0 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
I ′i = O(
1√
N
).
Hence, we have
− 1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 )) +
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0)) ≤ K(
1√
N
) = O(
1√
N
), (40)
where K is independent of N . By (40) and (39), it follows that
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 )) = O(
1√
N
),
and
1
N
J (N)soc (u(N)0 ;M(u(N)0 ))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) ≤ 0,
respectively. Thus, we have
∆1 =
1
N
J (N)soc (u∗0;M(u∗0))−
1
N
J (N)soc (uˇ0;M(uˇ0)) ≤ O(
1√
N
). (41)
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(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) is the trajectories of x∗i , i = 1, · · · , 100 and (b) is the curves of ε2i , i = 1, 2, 3
when time interval is [0, 12].
By Proposition 5.5, there exists K independent of N such that ‖uˇ0‖L2 ≤ K. Then, combining (38), (41), we
can obtain:
∆1 + ∆2 ≤ O( 1√
N
) + c(‖uˇ0‖L2) 1√
N
) ≤ K ·O( 1√
N
) = O(
1√
N
),
where K is independent of N . The theorem follows. 
6. Numerical examples
We now give a numerical example for Lemma 5.3. By (30) and (29), K and κ can be easily computed.
Consider Y = KX+ κ, we can obtain that
dX = [(A+ BK)X+ Bκ+ b]dt+ DdW0, Y = KX+ κ,
where X = ((xˆ)T (x¯0)T (q∗)T (l∗1)T (l∗2)T )T , Y = ((y∗)T (yˆ∗)T (y∗0)T (k1)T (k2)T )T . Since pi = P¯ x¯i + ϕ¯, by the
following equations below (31), we have
dx¯i = [(A−BR−1BT P¯ )x¯i −BR−1BT ϕ¯+ Cxˆ+ Fx¯0]dt+DdWi.
The realized decentralized state x∗0 and (x
∗)(N), can be derived by (32). Combining them with (24), one can
obtain
d
(
x∗0 − x¯0
(x∗)(N) − xˆ
)
=
[(
A0 C0
F A+ C
)(
x∗0 − x¯0
(x∗)(N) − xˆ
)
−
(
0
BR−1BT
)
(p(N) − pˆ)
]
dt+
1
N
(
0∑N
1 D
)
dWi,(
x∗0 − x¯0
(x∗)(N) − xˆ
)
(0) =
(
0
1
N
∑N
1 ξi − ξˆ
)
,
where pˆ = k2.
We continuously use the parameters in Example 4.1. The population N = 100 and the time interval is [0, 12].
By Matlab computation, the trajectories of the realized state x∗i is shown in Figure 1(a).
We defined ε21 = E
∫ 12
0
‖(x∗)(N)− xˆ‖2dt, ε22 = E
∫ 12
0
‖x∗0− x¯0‖2dt, ε23 = E
∫ 12
0
‖p(N)− pˆ‖2dt. When N increase
from 1 to 100, the curves of ε21, ε
2
2 and ε
2
3 are shown in Figure 1(b). The X axis indicates N and the Y axis
indicates ε2i , i = 1, 2, 3. It can be seen that they are approaching to zero when N is growing larger and larger.
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7. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the social optima in a class of LQ mean field control problem. We obtain the
decentralized form of the optimal controls for the leader and N followers. By Ricatti equation method, we
discuss the solvability of the FBSDE. Finally, a Stackelberg equilibrium theorem is established. For future
work, one can extend the results of this paper to the hierarchical control with many leaders case.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 5.3
By (31) and (32), we have
d(x∗)(N) = [A(x∗)(N) −BR−1BT p(N) + C(x∗)(N) + Fx∗0]dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi, (x
∗)(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi,
dx¯(N) = [Ax¯(N) −BR−1BT p(N) + Cxˆ+ Fx¯0]dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi, x¯
(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi,
dp(N) = −[AT p(N) + χ1]dt+ ζ0dW0 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
ζidWi, p
(N)(T ) = Gx(N)(T ) + χ2.
(42)
To prove Lemma 5.3, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Let x¯(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x¯i and p
(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 pi. Then
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x¯(N) − xˆ‖2 = O( 1
N
), sup
0≤t≤T
E‖p(N) − pˆ‖2 = O( 1
N
).
Proof. Combining (42) and (18), we can obtain
dµ1 = [Aµ1 −BR−1BTµ2]dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi, µ1(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi − ξˆ,
dµ2 = −[ATµ2 +Qµ1 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
ζidWi, µ2(T ) = Gµ1,
where µ1 = x¯
(N) − xˆ and µ2 = p(N) − pˆ. Denote µ2 = Pµ1 + ϕ, t ∈ [0, T ], where P ∈ C1([0, T ];Sn) is the
solution of the following Ricatti equation and ϕ ∈ C1([0, T ];Rn) satisfies
P˙ + PA− PBR−1BTP +ATP +Q = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], P (T ) = G,
dϕ = −(A−BR−1BTP )Tϕdt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PD − ζi)dWi, t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ(T ) = 0.
This is a standard Ricatti equation and the latter BSDE has a unique solution ϕ = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus µ2 = Pµ1
and
dµ1 = [A−BR−1BTP ]µ1dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi.
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By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖µ1‖2 = sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥∫ t
0
(A−BR−1BTP )µ1ds+
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi
∥∥∥∥2
≤2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥∫ t
0
(A−BR−1BTP )µ1ds
∥∥∥∥2 + 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
DdWi
∥∥∥∥2
≤2K
{
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
‖µ1‖2ds+ 1
N2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
‖D‖2ds
}
= 2K sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
‖µ1‖2ds+O( 1
N
),
where constant K is independent of N . Then, by Gronwall’s inequality and µ2 = Pµ1, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖µ1‖2 = O( 1
N
), sup
0≤t≤T
E‖µ2‖2 = O( 1
N
).
The lemma follows. 
Lemma A.2. Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. Let (x∗)(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i . Then
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x∗0 − x¯0‖2 = O(
1
N
), sup
0≤t≤T
E‖(x∗)(N) − x¯(N)‖2 = O( 1
N
).
Proof. Denote µ3 = x
∗
0 − x¯0 and µ4 = (x∗)(N) − x¯(N). By (42), we can obtain
d
(
µ3
µ4
)
=
[(
A0 C0
F A+ C
)(
µ3
µ4
)
+
(
C0
C
)
µ1
]
dt,
(
µ3
µ4
)
(0) =
(
0
0
)
.
For some constant K which is independent of N such that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥( µ3µ4
)∥∥∥∥2 = sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥∫ t
0
[(
A0 C0
F A+ C
)(
µ3
µ4
)
+
(
C0
C
)
µ1
]
ds
∥∥∥∥2
≤2K
{
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
∥∥∥∥( µ3µ4
)∥∥∥∥2ds+ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
‖µ1‖2ds
}
= 2K sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
∥∥∥∥( µ3µ4
)∥∥∥∥2ds+O( 1N ).
By Gronwall’s inequality, one can obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥( µ3µ4
)∥∥∥∥2 = O( 1N ).
Thus, the lemma follows. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Since
‖(x∗)(N) − xˆ‖2 = ‖(x∗)(N) − x¯(N) + x¯(N) − xˆ‖2 ≤ 2‖(x∗)(N) − x¯(N)‖2 + 2‖x¯(N) − xˆ‖2.
Combining Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, it leads to
E
∫ T
0
‖(x∗)(N) − xˆ‖2dt+ E
∫ T
0
‖p(N) − pˆ‖2dt+ E
∫ T
0
‖x∗0 − x¯0‖2dt ≤ T ·O(
1
N
) = O(
1
N
).
The lemma follows. 
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Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. By (24), (42), (32) and using a similar argument in Lemma A.2, one obtain that for some constant K
which is not dependent on N such that
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x∗0‖2 ≤ K, sup
0≤t≤T
E‖(x∗)(N)‖2 ≤ K.
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x∗i ‖2 = sup
0≤t≤T
E
∥∥∥∥ ∫ t
0
(Ax∗i −BR−1BT pi + C(x∗)(N) + Fx∗0)ds+DdWi
∥∥∥∥2
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ t
0
2‖Ax∗i ‖2 + 2‖BR−1BT pi‖2 + 2‖C(x∗)(N)‖2 + 2‖Fx∗0‖2ds+ sup
0≤t≤T
∫ t
0
2‖DdWi‖2
≤2E
∫ T
0
‖Ax∗i ‖2 + ‖BR−1BT pi‖2 + ‖C(x∗)(N)‖2 + ‖Fx∗0‖2ds+
∫ T
0
‖D‖2ds
≤2A2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∫ T
0
‖x∗i ‖2ds+K,
where constants K is independent of N . By Gronwall’s inequality, we have
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x∗i ‖2
] ≤ K,
where K is not dependent on N . Then, according to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s
inequality and the above discussion, we have
J (N)soc (u∗0;u∗) = αNJ0(u∗0;u∗) +
N∑
i=1
Ji(u∗0;u∗)
=αNE
{∫ T
0
[‖x∗0 −Θ0(x∗)(N) − η0‖2Q0 + ‖ − (αR0)−1BT0 y∗0‖2R0]dt+ ‖x∗0(T )
− Θˆ0(x∗)(N)(T )− ηˆ0‖2G0
}
+
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
[‖x∗i −Θ(x∗)(N)(t)−Θ1x∗0 − η‖2Q
+ ‖ −R−1BT pi‖2R
]
dt+ ‖x∗i (T )− Θˆ(x∗)(N)(T )− Θˆ1x∗0(T )− ηˆ‖2G
}
≤ NK,
where K is independent of N . The lemma follows. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5.6 and 5.7
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Since dδx0 = (A0δx0 + C0δx
(N))dt, δx0(0) = 0,
dδx(N) = [(A+ C)δx(N) +
B
N
δui]dt, δx
(N)(0) = 0,
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and by Proposition 5.5, we have ‖δui‖2L2 ≤ K, K is independent of N . Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it
follows that
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δx(N)‖2 =E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥ ∫ s
0
[(A+ C)δx(N) +
B
N
δui]dr
∥∥∥2
≤KE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2dr + 1
N2
‖K‖2dr ≤ KE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2dr +O
( 1
N2
)
,
where K is independent of N . By Gronwall’s inequality
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δx(N)‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
For δx0, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δx0‖2 =E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∫ s
0
[A0δx0 + C0δx
(N)]dr
∥∥∥2 ≤ KE∫ t
0
‖δx0‖2dr +O
( 1
N2
)
,
where K is independent of N . By Gronwall’s inequality
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δx0‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
Moreover,
ΘTQ(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η) ≤ 1
N
inf
(u0;u)
J (N)soc (u0;u) ≤ K.
Similarly, ΘT1 Q(x¯i − Θx¯(N) − Θ1x¯0 − η), ΘˆTG(x¯i(T ) − Θˆx¯(N)(T ) − Θˆ1x¯0(T ) − ηˆ), ΘˆT1 G(x¯i(T ) − Θˆx¯(N)(T ) −
Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ) are bounded. Thus,
〈ΘTQ(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx(N)〉+ 〈ΘT1 Q(x¯i −Θx¯(N) −Θ1x¯0 − η), δx0〉+ 〈ΘˆTG(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )
− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx(N)(T )〉+ 〈ΘˆT1 G(x¯i(T )− Θˆx¯(N)(T )− Θˆ1x¯0(T )− ηˆ), δx0(T )〉 = o(1).
The proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5.7. Since
d(
∑
j 6=i
δxj) = [A(
∑
j 6=i
δxj) + C
N − 1
N
δx(N) + F (N − 1)δx0]dt, (
∑
j 6=i
δxj)(0) = 0,
d(Nδx0) = [A0(Nδx0) + C0(Nδx
(N))]dt, (Nδx0)(0) = 0,
d(Nδxj) = [A(Nδxj) + C(Nδx
(N)) + F (Nδx0)]dt, (Nδxj)(0) = 0.
According to equations in (6), one can obtain
d(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj) = [A(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj) +
C
N
δx(N) + Fδx0]dt, (Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj)(0) = 0,
d(Nδx0 − δx†0) = [A0(Nδx0 − δx†0) + C0(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj) + C0(Nδxj − dδx†)]dt, (Nδx0 − δx†0)(0) = 0,
d(Nδxj − δx†) = [(A+ C)(Nδxj − δx†) + C(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj) + F (Nδx0 − δx†0)]dt, (Nδxj − δx†)(0) = 0.
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Combing with the results in Proposition 5.6, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj‖2 =E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∫ s
0
[A(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj) +
C
N
δx(N) + Fδx0]dr
∥∥∥2
≤KE
∫ t
0
‖Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj‖2dr +O
( 1
N2
)
,
where constant K is independent of N . By Gronwall’s inequality
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj‖2 = O( 1
N2
).
Since Nδx0 − δx†0 and Nδxj − δx† are coupled, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∥
(
Nδx0 − δx†0
Nδxj − dδx†
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
=E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ s
0
[(
A0 C0
F A+ C
)(
Nδx0 − δx†0
Nδxj − dδx†
)
+
(
C0
C
)
(Nδxj −
∑
j 6=i
δxj)
]
dr
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤KE
∫ t
0
∥∥∥∥∥
(
Nδx0 − δx†0
Nδxj − dδx†
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
dr +O
( 1
N2
)
,
where real-valued matrix K is independent of N . By Gronwall’s inequality
E sup
0≤t≤T
∥∥∥∥∥
(
Nδx0 − δx†0
Nδxj − dδx†
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
= O
( 1
N2
)
.
The proposition follows. 
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